Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes that handle hazardous substances by relying on good design principles, engineering and operating and maintenance practices.

PSM addresses the safety measures required to prevent accidental release of hazardous material from its containment such as vessel, piping and tank. PSM is a structured and proactive risk based approach which uses implementation techniques to manage process safety risks.

“Process safety deals with large scale and catastrophic workplace risks with major consequences, including fatalities, injuries, property damage, lost production or environmental damage. It looks into the events that have potential to release hazardous materials and energy.
Process safety is important to prevent catastrophic events and help reduce the occurence of a major accident.”

The objective of process safety management is to ensure that potential hazards are identified and mitigation measures are in place to prevent unwanted releases of energy or hazardous chemicals into locations that could expose workers to serious injuries or fatalities.

The product of the Hazard likelihood of occurrence and its associated magnitude of the severity.

Process safety is about managing the integrity of operating systems by applying inherently safer design principles, engineering and disciplined operating practices.

Layer of Protection (LOPA) is a simplified form of risk assessment which typically uses order of magnitude categories for initiating event frequency, consequence severity, and the likelihood of failure of independent protection layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk of a scenario.

Personal safety is the level of protection provided for individuals in a specific plant/ location.

Personal safety (mainly related to occupational safety) involves lower risk hazards, that are likely to occur at work on a more regular basis (e.g. slips, trips, etc).

Process Safety involves higher risk hazards that could lead to major accidents such as fire, explosion, and release of hazardous materials.

Process safety is important to prevent catastrophic events/ major accident hazards, serious injuries and illnesses, property damage, lost production, and negative environmental impact.and help reduce the occurence of a major accident.

Safety management is important to prevent accidents, injuries and ensure a safe business operation through applying suitable principles, frameworks and processes.

To prevent catastrophic events/ major accident hazards, serious injuries and illnesses, property damage, lost production, and negative environmental impact and help reduce the occurrence of a major accident.

Safety compliance is the process or state of being in accordance with safety standards and regulations established by the regulation body/ company/ organization/ government, with continuous monitoring and enforcement by these bodies.

Functional safety means the automatic safety function will perform the intended function correctly or the system will fail in a predictable (safe) manner.

Process control systems (PCS) are dynamic systems that have analog input and output to maintain or change process conditions to allow the system to operate within the intended operating envelope.

PSM Engineer is responsible to provide technical support on the Process Safety Management activities in order to ensure a safe working environment.

A PSM incident is an unexpected release of highly hazardous process materials such as toxic, reactive, and flammable liquids and gases.

Occupational health and safety are concerned with protecting the safety and welfare of people engaged in work or employment.

PSI stands for process safety information which contains information such as physical, chemical and toxicological information related to the chemicals, process and equipment.

An HSE Policy document outlines the general approach taken for matters related to health, safety and protection of the environment as essential values, whereby the responsible party recognises and accepts its health and safety duties for providing a safe working environment.

Process safety is disciplined that involves engineering and management skills focusing on preventing Hazard consequences from unexpected deviations in process conditions associated with the use of chemicals and petroleum products.

Process safety incidents can be inhibited by employing effective communication, provide workers with appropriate training, and ensure that a firm and well updated policies / procedures in place.

Center for Chemical Process Safety. A recognise professional body that commits to Process Safety by providing certification, courses, guidelines, membership and reports of statistical data (similar to US OSHA and Energy Institute – EI).

Workplace approach to manage process safety as a result of group values and behaviors.

Hazard Identification (HAZID) is a brainstorming workshop with a multi-disciplinary team to identify potential hazards. HAZID examines
all reasonably possible sources of hazard during project design, construction, installation, and decommissioning activities, and for proposed changes to existing operations.

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is an approach to determine the Integrity Levels (ILs) for all identified safeguarding process loops whilst Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a measure of safety system performance, in terms of probability of failure on demand (PFD).

The risk arising and safeguard in place to protect the user from injuries from the moving/operating machineries. This includes the access to the dangerous part of the machineries.

Process safety focuses on preventing fires, explosions and accidental chemical/ toxic releases in chemical/ process facilities or other facilities dealing with hazardous materials.

Any hazard or potential hazard should be considered significant if such a failure would directly or indirectly, be liable to endanger assets, environment and/or likely to cause serious or fatal injuries.

A hazard is significant if it can cause serious damage/ harm to facility, people or environment.

• The workplace should comply to the regulations/legislations (e.g., OSHA, ISO)
• ComprehensiveTraining provided for employees to prevent workplace injury and ensure the working environment is safe.
• Usage of labels and signs as its an effective way to communicate important information and serves as a gentle reminder
• Develop Risk Register (gives an overview to employees, the potential hazards, and ways to prevent)
• Establish a safety hierarchy and emphasize the accountability

The basic principles of effective safety management are Planning, Doing, Checking, and Acting (PDCA).

Process safety study is a thorough assessment that identifies potential causes and evaluates the consequences of hazardous releases, e.g. bowtie analysis, HAZOP, HAZID, FSAs, etc.

Process safety fundamentals are guidelines that emphasize good practices that would help prevent the occurrence of a major accident. These guidelines are applicable to everyone working with a hazardous material from management to the workforce.

A PSM Specialist is an individual who is highly qualified in process safety and its federal and state requirements as they are responsible for the execution of risk management projects. They are in charge of defining and managing the project.

Excel as a PSM Expert

An audit on the process safety management to ensure compliance with relevant regulatory or company/ standard requirements.

PSM Training is a course intended to provide a clear understanding of the Process Safety Management framework elements. It also provides guidelines on how to integrate the PSM element requirements into other Company programs.

Process Safety Management (PSM) Engineer oversees and supports the site process safety management initiatives and ensures compliance to applicable process safety regulations.

Potential hazardous events that arise from unwanted conditions /chemical processes, i.e. fire, explosions, toxic gas releases, dust, etc.

A thorough and detailed process/assessment of hazard identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation.

Risk assessment is a term used to describe the overall process or method where we identify hazards and risk factors that have the potential to cause harm (hazard identification); analyze and evaluate the risk associated with that hazard (risk analysis, and risk evaluation): and determine appropriate ways to eliminate the hazard, or control the risk when the hazard cannot be eliminated (risk control).

The aim of the risk assessment is to evaluate hazards and identify where gaps exist in risk management and develop (and implement) risk reduction measures.

Elements of risk assessments are:

1. Identify Hazard
2. Assess Hazard
3. Control Risks
4. Review Risk

Identification of Hazard, Assessment of Hazard and Risk, Control of Risk, and Review of the control effectiveness.

There are 3 main types of risk assessment tools, namely qualitative i.e. using matrices and hazard identification techniques featuring guidewords, semi-quantitative i.e. where word descriptors are associated with numerical ratings and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) which is based on detailed consequence modelling and frequency analysis.

Some of the benefits of risk assessment include maximising safety at minimum cost, helping to aid in decision making, calculating risk exposure and insurance requirements, as well as fulfilling certain legal requirements.

Risk Assessment includes:

• Identification of hazards
• Assessing the hazards
• Control measures
• Risk Matrix
• Risk Analysis/Evaluation
• Defining Risk Levels

Risk assessment can be conducted following the identification of major accident hazards within the facility. The risk assessment can be revisited in the event of a major change such as new machines, substances, and processes that could potentially lead to a major accident.

A risk assessment plan can be conducted by identifying the risks, assessing the risk, minimising/ eliminating the risks and assigning responsibilities to specific parties.

Risk is dependent on both the severity and likelihood of a hazard. The severity and likelihood of an event can be determined by risk assessment methods such as QRA.

Risk Management Tools include Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Consequence Modelling, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and societal risk (FN Curves).

Risks with similar attributes such as hazards, initiating events, consequences, etc. can be grouped, for example, hydrocarbon risk, transportation risk, occupational risk and etc.

1. Avoiding hazards that could lead to a catastrophic event
2. Help to build awareness of risk within the organisation
3. Improved operational efficiency
4. Helps companies to identify risk upfront hence minimise their losses at critical times
5. Maximised the safety and security within the workplace for employees and client
6. Business process improvement

Every time there is changes to design resulting in new hazards or change in the existing risk assessment outcome.

A statement that clearly describe the risk, causes, potential triggers and consequences.

QRA is a formal and methodical method to estimate the likelihood and consequence of potential hazards that could lead to major accidents. The output from this assessment is expressed quantitatively as a risk to personnel/human, environment, or financial loss. Critical assumptions and risk driving elements are also identified to asses the robustness and validity of the results.

Qualitative risk assessment uses matrices and hazard identification techniques featuring guidewords while Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is based on detailed consequence modelling and frequency analysis.

There are many types of quantitative risk assessment methods available. Here are some of the most used methods:

1. Probabilistic risk assessment
2. Risk-based models
3. Event tree analysis
4. Fault tree analysis
5. Scenario-based analysis
6. Vulnerability assessment
7. Frequency number (FN) curves

Quantitative risk assessment is summarised in these steps:

Hazard Identification, to determine hazard and categorisation of MAH

Release Frequency Analysis, to calculate the total release frequency for all release scenario through part counts

Consequence Modelling, to model the consequences (JF, FF, PF, EX)

Event Tree Analysis, to determine the potential end event likelihood

Risk Assessment, to estimate the fire impairment and personnel risk during the loss of containment

The quantitative risk analysis focuses on the major accident risk calculation, including its probability of occurrence and estimation of the magnitude of impact/modelling of the impact from the hazards should it lost of control, as well as identification and recommendation of the safeguard to minimise the risk.

Can be qualitative or quantitative depending on the tools used. HAZID and HAZOP is more qualitative analysis as the objective is more to identify any potential risks, determine the risk reduction measures and prioritise the action/risk reduction measure using the risk matrix.
While other tools such as LOPA is more quantitative, a series of data is required for the risk analysis/management that allows us to quantify the analysis and the results.

Qualitative assessment takes into consideration less tangible factors and is based more on gut reaction than on hard facts and data. Quantitative assessments are based on facts and associated data.

QRA is a consolidated and systematic risk analysis approach to quantify the risks associated with the operation of an engineering process. Usually, the results obtained from a QRA is to address the risks to People, Environment, Assets and Reputation (PEAR).

Individual risk is only considered tolerable only if further risk reduction is impracticable to implement.

By quantifying the risk based on the probability and severity of an event occurrence. Probability refers to the likelihood of occurrence whereas severity refers to the magnitude of the loss.

The first step in any quantitative risk assessment is to identify the hazards present in the process.

A Semi-QRA is an alternative approach to risk analysis, which highlights the assessment of hazards and barriers, risk influencing factors, and safety improvement measures. The analysis is conducted on the basis of hard data and analysis of failure causes, barrier performance and scenario development.

Risk = consequence x likelihood

Quantitative analysis is usually done by estimating the likelihood and consequence of hazardous events. The result is considered as an estimated risk to assets, people or the environment.

Quantitative methods are dependant on numbers to express the level of risk. Typically, quantitative risk assessments have more precision for ease of determination of analysis validity. Quantitative risk assessment relies on simple to complex models.

Four main types of quantitative research are:

1. Descriptive (current status of an identified variable)
2. Correlational (relationship between 2 or more variables with statistical data)
3. Casual-Comparative/ Quasi-Experimental (cause and effect relationship)
4. Experimental Research (via scientific method)

QRA is a formal and methodical method to estimate the likelihood and consequence of potential hazards that could lead to major accidents. The output from this assessment is expressed quantitatively as a risk to personnel/human, environment, or financial loss. Critical assumptions and risk driving elements are also identified to asses the robustness and validity of the results.

Results from QRA is used to support the understanding of the exposure of risk to employees, the environment, company assets and its reputation, and in turn, allow the company to make cost-effective decisions and manage the risks for the entire asset lifecycle.

HAZOP aims to identify the cause, consequence and safeguards due to any potential process deviations in different parts of the process systems.

A QRA is a formal and systematic approach to estimating the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events and expressing the results quantitatively as a risk to people, the environment or your business.

To understand the exposure of risk to personnel onsite and nearby population/public, environment, company assets and its reputation and to ensure the risk are well managed and within the ALARP region.

Hazard and Operability

HAZOP is a brainstorming session – carried out in workshop format – with objectives to identify any design or operability issue within the facility that might lead to safety or operation problems. HAZOP session should consist of a team with a multidisciplinary background, guided by a Facilitator. To help the brainstorming done systematically list of guidewords is used during the workshop and a Scribe will minutes the points result from the brainstorming.

HAZID aims to identify all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) associated with the facilities and pinpoint suitable mitigative measures to control risks to people, the environment and assets based on the process and layout.

HAZOP is undertaken using a systematic and highly structured approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of the design.

HAZOP Nodes are defined as pipe sections and vessels in which the process chemicals are present. Typically the nodes will follow the process flow (usually begins with the line that enters the P&ID). A change in the node is determined by the design intent, significant change of process conditions and/or next equipment / system.

HAZOP is a qualitative assessment to evaluate potential hazards and operability risks towards people, assets, and, company reputation, and the environment.

A HAZID meeting/review is a place/activity chaired by an experienced facilitator accompanied by a scribe with a multi-disciplinary team of specialists from across the project which includes but are not limited to process, operations, instrumentations, etc., to identify potential hazards of a specific plant area/ node. The meeting/review is a systematic review and brainstorming process of the team to determine the causes and consequences of a hazardous event.

A HAZID meeting/review is a place/activity chaired by an experienced facilitator accompanied by a scribe with a multi-disciplinary team of specialists from across the project which includes but are not limited to process, operations, instrumentations, etc., to identify potential hazards of a specific plant area/ node. The meeting/review is a systematic review and brainstorming process of the team to determine the causes and consequences of a hazardous event.

Typically, the scope of the HAZOP is discussed in the document known as the Terms of Reference. This document will be passed to the attendees, along with marked-up P&IDs which indicates how the process is split up into nodes.

To identify design or operational faults etc. leading to safety or operability problems.

Standard Guidance for HAZOP studies can be found in IEC 61882. Some organisations may have their own specific standard.

Ergonomic Hazards, Electrical hazards, slip-trip-fall, fire hazards etc.

Qualitative

HAZID is an evaluation approach to identify if any particular situation/condition, item, etc, may have the potential to cause accidents.

The bow tie risk assessment is a diagram method that can be used to analyse and demonstrate causal relationships in high-risk scenarios. The diagram is shaped like a bow-tie, creating a clear differentiation between proactive and reactive risk management.

HAZOP can be done at any stage of a project as long as sufficient information is available such as piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). HAZOP can be revisited when there’s a design change impacting the P&IDs.

Identified nodes through:
1) Design Intent
2) Significant change of process conditions
3) Equipment/System

• HAZOP for Continuous Operations
• HAZOP for Batch Operations
• Procedural HAZOP (i.e. Start-Up)
  Control HAZOP (CHAZOP)
• Electrical HAZOP (EHAZOP)/ Electrical Systems Safe Operability Review (SAFOP)

1. Understand the objectives of the hazard identification, the system/scope of the facility identified, etc.
2. Agreed on the facility area and the breakdown of node (if any)
3. Use guidewords to allow systematic brainstorming. Select a guidewords to help identify the hazard and start the discussion
4. Determine the cause of hazard
5. Determine the consequences
6. Identify if any preventive safeguards or mitigating measures in place related to the hazard / consequences
7. Identify if any recommendation can be put in addition from the preventive / mitigating measures in place to reduce/eliminate/manage the hazard
8. assess the risk ranking to determine the categorisation and prioritisation of each risk

The bowtie approach is used to understand and communicate key risk control measures at a whole range of facilities. Bow-Ties are a pictorial representation of the relationship between potential threats, preventive/control barriers in place and the ultimate consequences associated with each MAH.

Risk Assessment Register is a document that records all the organizations identified risks, the likelihood and consequences of a risk occurring. Additionally, the actions required to reduce the risks, and the focal person (who will be responsible to manage the risks) will also be captured in the risk assessment register.

HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability.

The HAZOP is undertaken using a systematic and highly structured approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of the design.

The six main hazard categories are biological hazard, chemical hazard, physical hazard, safety hazard, ergonomic hazard and psychological hazard.

The nine hazard classes are stated to be explosives, gases, flammable and combustible liquids, flammable solids, oxidising substances and organic peroxides, toxic and infectious substances, radioactive materials and corrosives.

A bowtie diagram is a pictorial representation of the relationship between potential threats, preventive/ mitigative barriers in place and the ultimate consequences associated with each major accident hazard.

The HAZOP review is conducted in compliance with the Standard/ Company guidelines in a workshop forum employing a multi-disciplinary team led by an experienced Facilitator.

It is the responsibility of the HAZOP facilitator to manage the team and the HAZOP study process to ensure that the multi-disciplinary team remain focused and that no nodes or hazards are missed by the team.

HAZID aims to identify all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) associated with the facilities and pinpoint suitable mitigative measures to control risks to people, the environment and assets based on the process and layout.

HAZOP is undertaken using a systematic and highly structured approach to examine the process and engineering intentions of the design.

The HAZID Study aims to identify all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) associated with the facilities and pinpoint suitable mitigative measures to control risks to people, the environment and assets based on the process and layout.

HAZID normally involves the following steps:

1. Risk Identification: identify hazards and the cause and consequences scenario
2. Risk Analysis and Assessment: identify the existing safeguards against the risk and assess the risk based on the Risk Matrix.
3. Risk Improvement: provide recommendations/actions (if any)

To determine the adverse effects of exposure to hazards and plan necessary actions to mitigate such risks.

The HAZID Study is a qualitative study that aims to identify all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) associated with the facilities.

A formal document to capture and record all the hazards, their causes, consequences safeguards, risk ranking and any related findings discussed in the HAZID workshop. This also includes the methodology to conduct the study and its nodes and information reviewed in the workshop.

A bowtie diagram is a pictorial representation of the relationship between potential threats, preventive/ mitigative barriers in place and the ultimate consequences associated with each major accident hazard.

Bowtie is a tool of risk assessment that demonstrates/visualise the relation between the causes, hazard, top event, consequences also safeguard and controls that can be considered as preventive (barrier) / mitigating measures.

Barrier based risk management is about identifying the critical controls (barriers) and understanding the status and effectiveness of the barriers to managing the risk.

Front line barrier management refers to personnel who are critical in ensuring all safety-critical task/activity is carried out to maintain the effectiveness of all barriers identified for a facility.

Risk barriers are safety measures or controls that provide an effective means against known risks to prevent unwanted events from taking place as well as to protect against their consequences.

Process Safety Barriers are physical / non-physical means planned to detect control, mitigate, and recover the impact of the hazard event consequences.

An operational barrier is a human action or response that activates a physical barrier to bring back the process from an abnormal state to a normal state, thereby enhancing the total system reliability.

A barrier is present between a threat and its unwanted consequences due to a chain of events. It can either eliminate the threat or prevent the consequences of it.

The barrier model presents the barriers in place to prevent unwanted events from taking place as well as to protect against their consequences.

1. Personnel not really familiar with the risk terms
2. Personnel lack of understanding of the organisation, function or process being risk assessed
3. The organisation culture is unsupportive towards the risk management implementation
4. The responsibility and ownership of the risk implementation action is unclear
5. How the risk should be communicated

BowTies are a pictorial representation of the relationship between potential threats, preventive/ control barriers in place and the ultimate consequences associated with each MAH.

Hazard, Top Event, Threat, Consequence, Prevention/ Mitigation Barrier, Escalation Factor, Escalation Factor Control of a specific MAH.

SCEs are the barriers (such as equipment, systems, or structures) that are in place to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident.

The elements from the Safety Critical Elements are:

• Structural Integrity
• Process Containment
• Ignition Control
• Protection Systems
• Detection Systems
• Shutdown Systems
• Emergency Response
• Lifesaving

SCEs are defined as equipment or structure whose failure will either cause or contribute to the MAH, or the purpose of which is to prevent, detect, control or mitigate a potential MAH. This information is usually available in Bow-Tie reports or Safety Case studies.

performance requirements/standards are verifiable requirements related to barrier element properties to ensure that the barrier is effective. They can include aspects such as capacity, functionality, effectiveness, integrity, reliability, availability, ability to withstand loads, robustness, expertise and mobilization time.

Essential equipment to prevent or mitigate the realisation of the uncontrolled event.

Safety critical equipment can be determined through process safety reviews such as HAZID, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and etc.

HSE critical equipment is equipment which is in place to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident.

Safety Critical Equipment (SCE) is any equipment within a Safety Critical Element that is relied upon in order for the Element to function as required to prevent MAH from occurring or to reduce its consequences. Some examples of safety-critical equipment onboard a vessel includes an emergency fire pump, emergency generator, emergency batteries, lifeboat engines, fixed fire fighting system, diesel generators, incinerators, and more.

The ALARP principle stands for “as low as reasonably practicable”. This principle intends to keep the risk level as low as possible provided that the ALARP evaluations are extensively documented.

Safety Critical Equipment (SCE) is any equipment within a Safety Critical Element that is relied upon in order for the Element to function as required. To illustrate, a high-pressure trip would be Safety Critical Element. For instance, a gas compressor may be related to a number of Safety Critical Elements such as hydrocarbon containment and overpressure protection.

Safety Critical procedure describes a procedure for a task which, if carried out incorrectly or not at all, could lead to serious plant damage, loss of containment, injury or fatality.

SECE is previously known as SCE. This change is due to the re-definition of the “major accident” in the Safety Case Regulation 2015 incorporating the elements of a major environmental incident.

The process hazard analysis is a thorough, orderly, systematic approach for identifying, evaluating, and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals.

Non safety-critical system is a failure that does not lead to an accident or the impact is relatively negligible.

Non-critical safety systems, are systems that add to the safety of the installation. While it does not render the installation unsafe when a non-critical safety system is switched off, it may introduce problems if they malfunction.

The ALARP principle stands for “as low as reasonably practicable”. This principle intends to keep the risk level as low as possible, with the assurance that the ALARP evaluations are thoroughly documented.

ALARP: As low as reasonably practicable.

SFAIRP: so far as is reasonably practicable.

Both have no difference and mean essentially the same thing, just different terminology as both aims to reduce risk

ALARP Demonstration is a process to demonstrate all prevention, control and mitigation barriers are adequate and effective in managing that risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

Safety equipment to protect the user against hazards that can cause any injuries.

A safety-critical function is a function that, if lost or degraded, or as a result of incorrect or inadvertent operation, can result in catastrophic or critical consequences.

Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) is a study of process hazards that include methods like HAZOP, What-If and Checklist. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic technique for identifying possible hazards in a work process.

Process Safety Information (PSI) is the basis of a Process Safety Management (PSM) program. It’s a process of data and information collection to help the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals.

PSI at least collect following information:

• Hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process;
• Information on the technology of the process; and
• Information on the equipment in the process.

Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) is a study of process hazards that include methods like HAZOP, What-If and Checklist. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic technique for identifying possible hazards in a work process.

Process Hazard Analysis is a systematic effort designed to identify and analyze hazards associated with the processing or handling of highly hazardous materials, in which the information obtained from the analysis helps the employers and workers in improving the safety of their systems.

The impact due to malfunction of a non-critical system is much lesser in comparison to malfunction of a critical system.

1. Identify the hazards
2. Decide who might be harmed and how
3. Evaluate the risks and decide on precautions
4. Record findings and implement them
5. Review risk assessment and update, if necessary

Risk is assessed by identifying the hazard and its control measure in place and evaluating it against the occurrence likelihood and the severity of the risk as defined in the risk matrix.

The residual risk rating is the amount of risk or danger associated with an action or event that remains after every effort has been made to eliminate such risks in a given situation through risk controls.

HAZOP can help to identify and solve the common operability issues such as maintenance, start-up, isolations, etc. as it provides a rigorous and systematic check of the design in terms of safety, operability and conformity to the standards.

For info only – HARA is hazard analysis and risk assessment that is traditionally performed by the safety team and does not consider the impact of security incidents. TARA is a threat analysis and risk assessment that’s performed to evaluate the risk associated with security incidents. TARA does not consider functional safety aspects.

FMEDA, which stands for Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis, is the methodology undertaken for the determination of failure causes and their impact on the systems which are applied in the early phases of system development very efficiently to help in the detection of weak points or flaws present in the system.

Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) refers to structural vibration in a piping system with vapour flow excited by intense acoustic pressure.

AIV cannot be stopped but it can be mitigated by the following recommendations:

• Using a higher pipe schedule or lowering the D/t ratio.
• Decreasing the flow velocity by increasing pipe diameter.
• By using noise trim which can be reduced by 15dB.

Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) is the result of turbulence in the process fluid, which occurs due to major flow discontinuities such as bends, tees, reducer, partially closed valves, branch connections and small-bore connections.

Acoustic-Induced Vibration (AIV) and Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) are vibration phenomena that can cause fatigue failure in piping systems induced by acoustic phenomena and fluid flows.

The AIV Study aims to identify all piping sections downstream of the pressure-reducing valves (i.e. relief valves, blowdown valves, restriction orifices and control valves) which have the potential for AIV.

The acoustic system refers to sound, the sense of hearing, and sound waves of pressure travelling through air or other gases. Sound is acoustic energy in the audible range, i.e. acoustic energy capable of being heard.

Acoustic protection is the application of soft and porous material to protect individuals against undesirable sounds and noises.

According to the literature, the main sources of vibration in a heat exchanger are vortex shedding, acoustical resonance, turbulent buffeting and fluid-elastic instability. In other instances, heat exchanger tubes tend to vibrate under the influence of crossflow velocities.

Acoustic frequency is the speed of the sound’s vibration which determines the pitch of the sound. Sound is caused by vibrations that transmit through a medium such as air and reach the ear or some other form of detecting device.

Acoustics is important in studying the effects of sound vibrations and how they interact with their surroundings. This includes the effects of acoustics on building and equipment by measuring how structure-borne sounds move through buildings which can induce the vibration of structures. The attempts to reduce noise are often related to issues of vibration.

Piping vibration can be mitigated by the following measures:

• Adding support to main piping to ensure mechanical natural frequency does not occur with pulsation frequency (which may cause vibration issues)
• Adding damping to main piping where the piping vibration is high.
• Reinforcing/enhancing the pipe stiffness can reduce vibration issues
• Adding supporting valves which add weight to provide sufficient stiffness

Turbulent Buffeting is the random turbulence that can excite tubes into vibration at their natural frequency by selectively extracting energy from a highly turbulent flow of gas across the bundle. This is a typical scenario in a heat exchanger.

Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) is the result of turbulence in the process fluid, which occurs due to major flow discontinuities such as bends, tees, reducer, partially closed valves, branch connections and small-bore connections.

Mitigations against FIV are as follows:

1. Increase the diameter of the pipe or pipe size to reduce the fluid velocity
2. Increase pipe wall thickness to increase system rigidity
3. Provide a better support configuration by increasing the number of support
4. Adding viscous damper, snubber, shock arrestor or other vibration reducers to the piping system as a vibration control measure

Acoustic-Induced Vibration (AIV) is structural vibration excited by intense acoustic pressure in a piping system and pressure reducing devices, whilst Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) is the result of turbulence in the process fluid which occurs due to major flow discontinuities.

Noise is an unwanted sound, this is depending on the receiver’s perspective and circumstances. It can be an unpleasant background sound, loud, or disruptive sound.

A noise assessment is an examination of the nature and characteristics of noise.

The method and instrument to be used is depending on the aim of the noise measurement. For personnel exposure, Dosimeter, Integrating Sound Level Meter or Sound Level Meter can be used. For Noise Survey or Noise Level Generated by Noise Source, ISLM or SLM can be used.

dB = 10*log10(P1/P2) where P are relative power or sound

Normally sound below 85dB would be acceptable for exposure of 8hrs/day. Noise above 140dB can be considered intrusive and normally not acceptable at any time without PPE.

Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modelling refers to the simulation of fluid and/or gases based on the principles of fluid mechanics, utilising numerical methods and algorithms.

Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) refers to an approach that analyses and solves problems that involve fluid flows.

CFD simulation enables visualisation of simulation results in 2D or 3D form without requiring to conduct a physical experiment which can be time-consuming at the same time cost-inefficient and could potentially extremely hazardous.

CFD analysis comprises of several component: 2D/3D model development, meshing, solver setup & calculations, and post-processing.

Some examples of readily available in market CFD tools are Ansys, OpenFOAM, ParaView, SOLIDWORKS, Autodesk CFD.

CFD simulation time consumption is mainly dependent on the number of nodes/elements of meshing, the number of iterations and computational power available. For a simple model (e.g. a cube), simulation can take a few minutes or even up to hours to complete, for a more complex model (e.g. FPSO) may take up to several days to complete simulation running.

Pre-processing, processing and post-processing

Simplified geometry, refined meshing quality, choosing the right model for calculations and checking for convergence.

BowTie is a risk evaluation method that gives a visual summary of all plausible accident scenarios that could exist around a certain hazard as well as the control measures that a company has in place to control those scenarios.

Bow-Tie diagrams are used to identify potential escalation factors that could reduce the effectiveness or reliability of a barrier, as well as control barriers in place to prevent or mitigate the effect of these escalation factors.

BowTie is an approach that integrates a fault tree (on the left side) and an event tree (on the right side) to represent causes, threats (hazards) and consequences in a common platform. The Bowtie technique offers a powerful visual tool for analyzing hazard scenarios and communicating to the workforce how hazards are released, how they can escalate and how they can be managed effectively.

BowTieXP is the most used risk assessment software that is based on the BowTie Method to assess risk. It allows users the ability to visualize complex risks in a clear way while still being detailed.

The BowTie method is a visual way of understanding the impacts of a hazard, the risk it presents, the consequences and the controls that should be put in place. This allows us to easily conduct Risk Management. BowTie diagrams also identify potential escalation factors that could defeat or reduce the effectiveness/ reliability of a barrier, as well as control barriers in place to prevent or mitigate the effect of these escalation factors.

BowTie is analysed by evaluating the relationship between potential threats, preventive/ control barriers in place and the ultimate consequences associated with each MAH and also by identifying potential escalation factors that could defeat or reduce the effectiveness/ reliability of a barrier, as well as control barriers in place to prevent or mitigate the effect of these escalation factors.

Barrier based risk management is about identifying the critical controls (barriers) and understanding the status and effectiveness of the barriers to managing the risk.

1. Identify the risk to be examined in the bow-tie analysis. Typically used for high risks events (i.e. the MAH of the facility) that are expected to have a high level of consequence.
2. Identify the events that can cause the hazard (MAH) to occur.
3. Identify and list down the causes and the consequences to the hazard on the left and right of the hazard respectively.
4. List down existing controls on the causes (preventive controls) below the causes on the left, and the controls on the consequences (corrective/mitigative controls) below the consequences on the right.
5. Optionally, rank the risk to each consequence of the hazard.
6. Identify any potential event that could cause escalation to the failure of each control/barrier.

BowTie Methodology is a brainstorming method that utilises a diagram in ‘bowtie’ shape which visualises an overview of multiple plausible scenarios and hence, it provides a simple visualisation of risk.

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) are multiple independent operations that occur on a location at the same time. Events of any one operation may impact the safety of personnel or equipment of another operation (i.e., construction, welding or working at heights).

Through SIMOPS study, we are able to identify possible interactions between activities that may adversely impact people, property or the environment.

By conducting a SIMOPS Risk Assessment and producing a Matrix of Permitted Operations.

Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) is used to maintain an acceptable level of risk for the operations. MOPO is a guide to define the limit of safe operations or activities that are permitted if control and/or mitigation measures are reduced and/or removed e.g. SCEs in terms of threat controls, recovery preparedness and escalation factors are partially present or not present.

The SIMOPS risk assessment is conducted using the following steps:

1. Identify the combined operations
2. Execute Risk Assessment for each task separately
3. Identify the additional hazards introduced by the SIMOPS
4. Assessing the relevant level of risk
5. Verify the adequacy of the planned control measure
6. Identifying additional risk reduction measures.

Reference tool to determine if activities can be performed simultaneously.

Risk is assessed through three main steps: (1) Hazard identification (2) Risk analysis and evaluation (3) Risk control

Simultaneous Operation (SIMOPS) of construction activities focuses on the construction phase of a project which does not include installation and production activities.

MOPO stands for Matrix of Permitted Operations. The study is done to map operational activities against foreseeable situations that would compromise safe operating limits. The matrix would identify and differentiate between permitted, permitted with caution and not permitted conditions to help operators make decisions in given scenarios.

A manual of permitted operations (MOPO) is a visually coded manual or matrix used to define whether a work activity can be conducted safely within a given condition. It was developed by Shell’s Technical Safety Engineering Team primarily for controlling the level of risk associated with SIMOPs.

After the hazards identified in SIMOPS is completed, the Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) is conducted to identify if any restrictions are to be imposed or if the simultaneous undertaking of the two activities is to be prohibited.

ALARP principle is to reduce the potential risk of hazard as reasonably practicable so that the risk can be controlled.

Permit-to-work refers to management systems used to ensure that work is done safely and efficiently typically in a hazardous environment.

The main goal of risk assessment is to provide protection to the four critical elements to a company, which include People, Environment, Asset, and Reputation (PEAR).

ISO 17776:2016 describes processes for managing major accident (MA) hazards during the design of offshore oil and gas production installations. It provides requirements and guidance on the development of strategies both to prevent the occurrence of MAs and to limit the possible consequences. It also contains some requirements and guidance on managing MA hazards in operation.

ALARP HSE is a short form of as low as reasonably practicable health, safety and environment which reasonably practicable involve weighing a risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control it. Thus, ALARP HSE describes the level to which we expect to see workplace risks controlled.

1. Identify the hazards
2. Assess the risks
3. Control the risk
4. Record findings
5. Review controls

Fire and explosion, structural failure, occupational risk, ship collision risk, dropped object risk etc.

• Review SIMOPS activity and agree to priorities, interfaces etc.
• Check Job Safety Analysis is prepared and approved.
• Convey HSE expectations to subcontractors.
• Confirm Work Permit is applied for and approved.
• Check rigging and electrical tools are inspected.
• Check toolbox meeting held.
• Check fire and rescue team is notified.
• Ensure subcontractors are familiar with incident reporting procedures.
• Ensure on-site construction and safety monitoring occurs. Arrange training, as required.

An HSE Management Plan is a written document that aims to achieve effective health and safety outcomes by having a strategy and making clear plans.

Step 1 – Hazard Identification
Step 2 – Identification of Top Event and Threats
Step 3 – Assessment of Risks
Step 4 – Identification of Red and Yellow Risks
Step 5 – Hazard Control and Recovery Analysis
Step 6 – Maintaining the Integrity of Control and Recovery Barriers
Step 7 – Managing Risks to ALARP

ISO 45001 specified the requirements for an occupational health and safety (OH&S) management system in place by an organization.

ALARP study is to review the formal safety assessment findings to help ensure that all risks to personnel are identified and accurately represented.

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

The ALARP Principle stands for “as low as reasonably practicable”. This principle intends to keep the risk level as low as possible, with the assurance that the ALARP evaluations are thoroughly documented.

ALARP is important as to identify additional risk-reducing measures which aim to be implemented in the facilities provided that the costs are not grossly disproportionate to the benefits.

Handling is any work that relates to moving, transporting or supporting a load including lifting, pushing, carrying and etc, whilst Lifting itself means any work for lifting and lowering loads.

The “ALARP region” lies between unacceptably high and negligible risk levels.

Disproportion factor refers to the costs of a potential safety measure that grossly exceeds the value of the safety benefits obtained should the measure be implemented.

ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) mainly suggests a balance between risk and benefit, whilst ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) takes into account social and economic factors.

ALARP HSE is the short form of as low as reasonably practicable health, safety and environment which reasonably practicable involves weighing a risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control it. Thus, ALARP HSE describes the level to which we expect to see workplace risks controlled.

ALARP Demonstration refers to the process of demonstrating that the risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

ALARP is used to consider the individual risk or societal risk where the risk that lies in the unacceptable region should be reduced and well managed to be within the tolerable region.

ALARP is important as to identify additional risk-reducing measures which aim to be implemented in the facilities provided that the costs are not grossly disproportionate to the benefits.

Risk level that is lower than the tolerable limit.

A risk matrix is a tool that is normally used to assess the level of risk and used to support the decision-making process.

A safety case is a logical and hierarchical set of documents that describes the risk in terms of the hazards presented by the facility, site, and modes of operation. Safety case includes facility description, health, safety, and environment system, formal safety assessments and emergency response plan of an organisation.

Safety case aims to summarise relevant studies and it is typically segregated into several sections which are presented in the following (such as):
– Part 1: Introduction and Summary
– Part 2: Facility Description
– Part 3: Facility Safety Management System
– Part 4: Formal Safety Assessment
– Part 5: Safety-Critical Element and Performance Standards
– Part 6: Emergency Response Plan
– Part 7: Conclusion and Remedial Action Plan

The purpose of a Safety Case is to demonstrate the internal/ external assurance that its management system͛s risk-reducing controls related to the HSE aspects of its operations has been controlled/ managed in such a way that the risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels. This document aspired to maximise awareness, understanding and knowledge of the Safety Case, targeting areas and improvement via cascading the right information to the right people in the right way (that is including but not limited to HSE induction, training and the like).

A safety case’s intent is to provide a straightforward, thorough, and logically consistent argument, backed up by evidence, that an item is free of unacceptable risk when used in the proper context.

Safety measures are activities and precautions carried out to reduce the probability of hazard occurrence and increase safety or protection.

The safety management system is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls.

The term ‘safety argument’ is sometimes used as a synonym for the safety case. Here, we use the safety argument to mean that part of the safety case combines the safety evidence, showing that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the system is acceptably safe.

The Health and Safety (H&S) Assurance function is responsible for monitoring the appointed Principal Contractors and Elected Clients against key criteria including:

• Legislation and associated best practice guidance
• Approved and Joint Codes of Practice
• The Works Information (contractual arrangements) document

Safety risk management is a key component of any safety management system (SMS) and involves identifying safety hazards to your operations and assessing the risks and mitigating them.

Alarm safety has helped the oil and gas industry to resolve their maintenance outages and help operators quickly assess the situation to get plant operations back in business. It also avoids the distraction of non-essential data and guides workers to better process visibility, better decision making and improved safety.

A system to notify the operators to take action at the appropriate time to avoid undesired consequences.

Process alarms are generated when preset parameter levels for real or derived process variables are exceeded.

To allow effective operator management of process upsets by annunciating critical alarms in a timely manner that an operator may react to in order to avoid escalation of the event.

Alarm safety has helped the oil and gas industry to resolve their maintenance outages and help operators quickly assess the situation to get plant operations back in business. It also avoids the distraction of non-essential data and guides workers to better process visibility, better decision making and improved safety.

Absence of unreasonable risk under the occurrence of hazards resulting from functional insufficiencies of the intended functionality, operational disturbances or by reasonably foreseeable misuse/errors.

An operational hazard is any condition, action, or set of circumstances that have the potential to compromise the safety, financial, and social performance of the facility. The risk is segregated into five categories: people, process, systems, external events, and legal and compliance.

Operations can improve the safety aspects by evaluating the design, safe operating limits (alarms and trips etc.), and performing essential studies such as SIL to evaluate the reliability of critical equipment in place to mitigate a hazardous event.

Operations management (OM) is the administration of business practices to create the highest level of efficiency possible within an organization. It is concerned with converting materials and labour into goods and services as efficiently as possible to maximize the profit of an organization. Safety is not a part of operations management but is a central core that governs the entire operation.

These are risks that are associated with operations and relate primarily to operational unreliability as a result of an unplanned event.

Safety, Environment, Finance, Reputation

General workers safety roles and responsibilities are:

1. Follow safe work procedures
2. Report unsafe conditions or incidents
3. Cooperate with others on matters relating to occupational safety and health
4. Be alert of Hazards present in the workplace so that you can protect yourself and others

Operational Risk is measured in the steps below:

• Identify Risks
• Analyse Risks
• Evaluate Risks
• Risk Decision Making
• Implementation of Risk Controls

HAZID, HAZOP, FMEA, QRA

Operational Risk is measured in the steps below:

• Identify Risks
• Analyse Risks
• Evaluate Risks
• Risk Decision Making
• Implementation of Risk Controls

1. Report all work injuries and illnesses immediately
2. Report all Unsafe Acts or Unsafe Conditions to your Supervisor
3. Use seat belts when on Company business in any vehicles
4. Firearms, weapons, or explosives are not permitted on Company Property.
5. Use, possession, sale or being under the influence of illegal drugs, misuse of prescription drugs and/or alcohol is not permitted on Company Property or while “on duty”.
6. Only authorized and trained Employees may repair or adjust machinery and equipment. Lock and Tag Out Procedures must be followed before removing any machine guards or working on powered machinery and equipment. Replace all guards when the job is completed.
7. Only qualified and trained Employees may work on or near Exposed Energized Electrical Parts or Electrical Equipment. Follow Electrical Safety Rules when working with electrically powered machinery and equipment.
8. Only authorized and trained Employees may enter a posted Confined Space. All confined spaces will be posted Confined Space – Permit Required. Entry is allowed only after permits are properly issued.
9. Only authorized and trained Employees may dispense or use chemicals. It is your responsibility to know where SDS’s (Safety Data Sheets) are located and that they are available for your use and review.
10. Keep work areas clean and aisles clear. Do not block emergency equipment or exits.
11. Wear and use the prescribed Personal Protective Safety Equipment. This includes foot protection, head protection, gloves, etc.
12. Smoking is permitted only in the designated “Smoking Areas”.

Risk is the probability of a harmful event occurring arising from a hazard.

Process Safety Culture, Identify & Assess Risks, Managing Risks, Review & Improve

Operational safety case is a document that consist the information for an installation to demonstrate that there are effective means for ensuring a safe operation throughout facility life. In addition, safety case ensures a comprehensive hazard management process implemented to demonstrate risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

• Identify the phase i.e. project design phase or operation phase
• Identify Company HSE Requirement
• Identify any document that demonstrates the requirement has been implementes
• Identify if any reference / Company preference for the Safety Case structure, other wise will use SOG’s structure
• Develop each part of safety case based on the Company / project reference documents

A safety case is a document which provides a clear and comprehensive argument , supported by evidence to demonstrate that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular environment.

HSE Safety Case – demonstrating that an activity or operation will be safe and without undue risks to PEAR and that all practicable steps (i.e., Risk assessments, ALARP) have occurred to ensure this.

Organisations that operate facilities with major hazards that could cause catastrophic damage to health, safety, and the environment are commonly required to submit a safety case.

The prime purpose of the safety case is for the Duty holder to demonstrate to the Regulator there are effective means for ensuring safe operation in accordance with a goal-setting safety regulation regime. In addition, safety case ensures a comprehensive hazard management process is implemented to demonstrate risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

The Safety Case Author works within a team of safety professionals to produce a Safety Case. Site Licence Conditions require Safety Cases to be produced in respect of any operation that may affect safety, at different phases in the life cycle of facilities, e.g. design, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning. They need to take a holistic approach to assess operations and therefore often have experience in varied aspects of the field.

A safety case is a written demonstration of corroboration and scrutiny provided by a corporate entity to prove that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and control hazards effectively.

The safety case document contains the technical risk management aspects in detail with a comprehensive analysis of the overall adequacy to ensure a comprehensive hazard management process implemented to demonstrate risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

Safety Management System is a systematic approach undertaken by an organisation in order to manage the safety risk, including organisational structures, policies and procedures within the organisation.

The term ‘safety argument’ is sometimes used as a synonym for the safety case. Here, we use the safety argument to mean that part of the safety case combines the safety evidence, showing that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the system is acceptably safe.

The safety case document contains the technical risk management aspects in detail with a comprehensive analysis of the overall adequacy to ensure a comprehensive hazard management process implemented to demonstrate risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

A Safety Case Advisor is responsible for supporting the Safety Case Manager in developing, maintaining and reviewing the Safety Case for their area.

The four pillars of safety management are policy and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.

Identifying and defining goals (e.g. policies, commitment), Planning, Implementation & operation, Performance monitoring, Audit & review.

Workplace safety procedure is implemented in accordance with applicable legislation/standards to ensure the manuals and procedures required to support operations are identified, available, accurate, up-to-date, understood and continuously used.

A FEED Verification is a systematic approach for reviewing a FEED Package developed by others to be verified the required accuracy, level of completeness, minimise engineering risk of rework or cost escalations, and minimal project cost.

Front End Engineering Design and Engineering, Procurement and Construction

Various studies take place to figure out technical issues and estimate rough investment costs. The product of the activity is called “FEED Package” which amounts up to dozens of files and will be the basis of bidding for EPC Contract.

a work order to execute a project in FEED phase

FEED (Front End Engineering Design) means Basic Engineering which is conducted after completion of Conceptual Design or Feasibility Study.

This is a single point responsibility, which is passed onto the EPC contractor to be fully responsible for the delivery of the contract, meeting all the requirements and without the involvement of the FEED contractor or client/owner.

Various studies take place to figure out technical issues and estimate rough investment costs. The product of the activity is called “FEED Package” which acts as start-up documents for the detailed engineering design phase.

Engineering, Procurement and Construction

A company that undertakes FEED Phase project

Both term are identical

Pre-FEED Engineering is a preliminary step that is usually undertaken before starting the basic engineering work.

Engineer involve in FEED project.

EPC companies are engaged in engineering, procurement, and construction services on a contract basis, for contracts awarded for particular project work.

Engineering, Procurement and Construction

Engineering, Procurement and Construction

Verification by a third party (not directly responsible for quality control or acceptance) of the product.

Provide greater confidence to stakeholders about the quality of the product.

Readiness Review is a systematic process to verify readiness and traceability of the condition of process equipment safety systems and status of resources mobilisations including qualifications of personnel conform to predefined conditions.

Readiness reviews can also be referred to as Pre-Startup Reviews.

Readiness review is a key milestone within project management, and a properly documented readiness assessment should be conducted before any project commences live operations.

Operational Readiness review is a systematic process to verify that plant and equipment is in a safe condition, and that personnel are appropriately prepared, before start-up or return to normal operation. Typically conducted in a workshop format involving relevant project and site stakeholders

Operational Readiness review is typically conducted prior to commencement of live operations, involving:

• new or modified plant and equipment;
• return from maintenance, and
• restart the following system or full plant trip or planned shutdown.

Customised checklist of questions that need to be answered as part of the Readiness Review process. Typical areas which can be covered in the checklist include:

• HSE;
• Process Safety;
• Management of Change;
• QA/ QC;
• Maintenance;
• Operating Procedures and Safe Work Practices;
• Training and Competency;
• Emergency Response;
• Electrical & Instrumentation;
• Piping;
• Rotating Equipment;
• Instrumentation and Control;
• SIMOPS; and
• Security.

Following the implementation of new or modified plant and equipment, an operational readiness review should be conducted before reinstating or starting up the facilities.

A readiness assessment is typically conducted in a workshop format involving relevant project and site stakeholders.
The assessment will evaluate and provide suitable answers to a series of checklist questions designed to gauge the project/facility readiness.

Answers will also be attached with documented evidence to demonstrate compliance.

A readiness document summarises the findings of the readiness assessment as well as any gaps identified.

The operational readiness plan outlines the activities, timeline and resources required to achieve operational readiness.

This plan draws upon the Readiness Document / Report to ensure that all stated activities are fulfilled. This also includes steps required to address gaps identified from the Readiness Report.

Readiness review criteria typically cover:
− hardware;
− control system and software;
− human and organisational factors;
− operating procedures, and
− documentation.

A readiness assessment is a systematic process of evaluating areas necessary for ensuring the safe startup of a process/facility. The assessment would then conclude on project readiness for the startup, based upon compliance with the aforementioned areas.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

Examples of loss prevention systems provided for hydrocarbon facilities include:
– Provision of Ex-Rated Instruments
– Hazardous Area Classification
– Active and Passive Fire Protection Systems
– Fire and Gas Detection System
– Pressure Relief (Flare and Vapor Disposal)
– Open and Closed Drains
– Building blast protection
– HVAC system
– Thermal Insulation
– Escape and Evacuation Route
– Manual alarm call points

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

The loss prevention philosophy implemented in a hydrocarbon facility for the safe operation of the facility either during manned operations or unmanned operations depends on parameters such as the design strategy adopted while designing the facility (such as facility layout, fire protection, flaring design, drains design), areas classifications inside the facility that is designed, escape and evacuation route, climate control etc.

Hazardous events usually occur either as the result of a combination of unusual circumstances, occurring simultaneously or by allowing the escalation of a series of minor events, none of which is, by itself, a major hazard. Therefore, the installation is designed robustly to detect conditions that could lead to hazardous situations, and to rapidly, automatically apply, or allow the application of, corrective measures. Similarly, consideration is given to the design of escape facilities to prevent their obstruction or impairment by hazardous events.

Human and organisational factors, as widely acknowledged, are still the largest contributors to accidents and will require further attention within the safety community.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

The design of loss prevention systems (such as fire and gas detection systems, firewater systems etc.) is a skill.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

To prevent hazard consequences to occur that can bring injury, ill death or death in the workplace by using a variety of methods.

To ensure the Health and Safety of people and protection of the Environment by providing a standard approach for managing process safety, personal safety and operational credibility.

HSE stands for Health, Safety and Environment, the term is usually associated with planning, implementing, monitoring and optimising operational occupational health and safety rules and regulations and environmental protection.

HSE plan is a document that outlines the safety measures and procedures implemented in the workplace.

HSE is used to identify potential hazards to people or the environment and to develop the best practices to reduce or remove the hazards.

1. Policy and commitment
2. Planning
3. Implementation and operation

1. Policy
2. Organizing
3. Planning and implementation
4. Measuring performance
5. Reviewing performance
6. Audit

COSHH is a set of regulations that require employers to control substances with the purpose to protect workers when working with hazardous substances and materials.

1. Designing, developing and implementing suitable and proportionate management arrangements, risk control systems and workplace precautions
2. Operating and maintaining the system while also seeking improvement where needed
3. Linking it to how you manage other aspects of the organisation

An HSE plan is usually developed by the Project Manager/ HSE Manager/ HSE Officer/ Company Director.

1. Engaging in work practice to reduce risk,
2. Communicating hazards and accidents, and
3. Exercising employee rights and responsibilities.

1. Employers committed to making the program work
2. Employees involved in the program
3. Create a system to identify and control hazards
4. Compliance with safety and health regulations
5. Training on safe work practices
6. Mutual respect, caring and open communication in a climate conducive to safety
7. Continuous improvement

1. Leadership and Engagement
2. Safety Management Systems
3. Risk Reduction
4. Performance Measurement

Local authorities

Control of Substances Hazardous to Health, 10 Golden Rules:

1. Be sure to have clear readable labels and follow the instructions for use.
2. Use protective clothing provided
3. Don’t mix chemicals. Mixing chemicals can kill.
4. Never put chemicals into unmarked containers.
5. Never put chemicals into bottles or containers that have other uses, for example, eating or drinking.
6. Be sure to know what first aid treatment is required if accidental spill chemicals occur.
7. Store all chemicals safely.
8. Report any damaged containers, spil or faulty containers to the supervisor.
9. Always follow the safety rules and develop safe working practices in the workplace.
10. Report anything wrong to your supervisor.

Key Performance Indicator. KPI is a measurable value that demonstrates the effectiveness of an organization in achieving its key objectives in regard to HSE. Usually, for HSE it covers two types of indicators for the KPI, leading indicator and lagging indicator.

1. Legal and international standards requirement
2. Reflects business/company commitment to manage and operate its business with acknowledging and implementing the Quality, Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) function.

The oil and gas sector has an inherent risk that is unlikely to be removed entirely from industry operations.

Health and Safety Executive

Health and Safety Commission

• Implement safety protocols from the start to build a personnel safety culture
• Ensure all personnel are aware and follow the HSE management system in place
• Familiar with your working environment. Observe and communicate if any potential hazard/risk presence
• Evaluate regularly to improve the safety management system in the facility/operations

• Fires and Explosions – a major concern in offshore / oil rigs, considering the sensitive and confined environment. Any ignition source i.e. spark, unexpected rise in well pressure, etc. can trigger catastrophic fires and blowout-type explosions.
• Fall-related Accidents, man overboard, etc
• Dropped objects
• Transportation limitation – in case of accidents that require immediate treatment and evacuation.

Determines the existence and extent of hazardous locations in a facility containing any flammable and combustible chemicals where explosive atmospheres may occur.

Provides the details of Hazardous and Non-Hazardous areas in the facility which helps in identifying the possibility of risks such as Fire and Explosion.

Following terms are all synonymous to EAC;
– Hazardous Location;
– Hazardous Classified Location; and;
– Classified Areas.

Class I—Locations in which flammable gases or vapors may or may not be insufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Class II—Locations in which combustible dust (either in suspension, intermittently, or periodically) may or may not be insufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Class III—Locations in which ignitable fibres may or may not be insufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Class 1: Locations in which flammable gases or vapors may or may not be in sufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Division 2: indicates that the hazardous material has a low probability of producing an explosive or ignitable mixture and is present only during abnormal conditions for a short period of time.

A drawing that presents or shows the classification of hazardous areas.

Locations that have been determined to be hazardous or non-hazardous. For hazardous areas, the location can be further classified according to Class, Divison and Group.

The firewater demand calculation is carried out to determine the quantity of firewater required for a firewater system to provide sufficient demand for firefighting and exposure protection within a facility.

The firewater deluge demand is then calculated as Q = A × W where:

Q=Flow required to protect the exposure area of the vessel (l/min)
A= Exposed surface area (m^2)
W=Application rate for exposure cooling (l/min/m^2)

The volume of a rectangle tank = LxWxH

The volume of a cylindrical tank = pi x r^2 x h

The volume of the holding vessel times the density of water expressed in gallons per cubic foot (7.48 gal/cu) will give the fire water capacity.

The water demand is measured in lpcd i.e. litres per capita per day. Per capita here represents per person. Hence, lpcd is the amount of water required per person per day in litres. Lpcd is calculated by the formula below:

1 lpcd = [Total Yearly Consumption or Population ]/ [ 360 x Design Population]

The water required for unexpected fire accidents and undesirable situations with fire is already designed during the water demand planning system. The demand is calculated based on empirical formulas. For all the formulas given below, Q is the discharge calculated in litres per minute and P is the population measured in thousands.

1. Kuichling’s Formula
Q = 3182P1/2

2. Buston’s Formula
Q = 5663P1/2

3. Freeman’s Formula
Q = 1136[0.2P + 10]

4. National Board of Underwater Formula
Q = 4637P1/2[1 – 0.01P1/2]

Average daily demand (q) = Px where:

P= Population, x = water in lpcd
1. Maximum Daily Demand (MDD) = Q = 1.8q
2. Maximum Hourly Demand ( MHD) = Q = 1.5MDD = 2.7q

Fire demand is given by the formula, Q = 100 X sqrt(p) where:

P = population in thousands
Q = water demand in kiloliters.

A safe route (horizontal and vertical) for people to travel from any location in the building or structure to a safe place, without the need for outside assistance.

Brainstorm a list of emergency scenarios where evacuation is necessary and visualise the evacuation process from noticing the emergency event, taking action and evacuation time, taking into consideration of the elderly and disabled people.

A map of the space showing all doors and windows, and the escape routes leading to the safe space for all occupants to gather.

Brainstorm a list of emergency scenarios where evacuation is necessary and visualise the evacuation process from noticing the emergency event, taking action and evacuation time, taking into consideration of the elderly and disabled people.

A safe route (horizontal and vertical) for people to travel from any location in the building or structure to a safe place, without the need for outside assistance.

Escape route(s) must be accessible at all times.

It is best to have 2 or more escape routes.

Drill frequency would depend on the complexity of the emergency scenario and the building structure. As a minimum, it is advisable to conduct yearly.

To guide people to evacuate a building safely and efficiently.

Evacuation steps to guide people to evacuate a building safe from the point of noticing the emergency event, take action and leave the building efficiently. It should also include emergency contacts/ support and emergency aids within the building.

To guide people to evacuate a building safely and efficiently.

The main and most direct escape route is used to evacuate a building/space.

Visualise the evacuation process from noticing the emergency event, taking action and evacuation time, taking into consideration of the elderly and disabled people. Conduct a fire drill and get feedback from participants.

MOC review is a systematic approach to organizational changes with the aim of ensuring the continued safety of the workforce throughout the process.

Management of Change is defined as a formal process that systematically manages Changes to the organization, operations, process equipment, technology, procedures, chemicals, or for any temporary modifications that could impact the original design, operating & maintenance criteria, and/or environmental performance.

MOC is a system to ensure that introduced changes are thoroughly scrutinized prior to implementation. It helps to ensure that changes to a process do not inadvertently introduce new hazards or unknowingly increase the risk of existing hazards. It includes a review and authorization process for evaluating proposed adjustments to facility design, operations, organizations.

MOC is a system to ensure that introduced changes are thoroughly scrutinized prior to implementation. It helps to ensure that changes to a process do not inadvertently introduce new hazards or unknowingly increase the risk of existing hazards. It includes a review and authorization process for evaluating proposed adjustments to facility design, operations, organizations.

Changes to the organization, operations, process equipment, technology, procedures, chemicals, or any temporary modifications that could impact the original design, operating & maintenance criteria, and/or environmental performance.

Changes to the organization, operations, process equipment, technology, procedures, chemicals, or any temporary modifications that could impact the original design, operating & maintenance criteria, and/or environmental performance.

The three most common types are administrative MOC, organizational MOC, and technical MOC. Nonetheless, this can differ based on company definitions. Some companies MOC can be categorised into temporary change, emergency change, software changes and etc.

The Initiator can be one or any of the core technical personnel assigned as part of the Operations team.

The MOC section of the PSM standard requires the employer to develop and implement written procedures to manage changes. The procedure should include descriptions of the technical basis for the change, impact on safety and health, modifications to operating procedures, the time period necessary for the change, and appropriate authorizations. Any employee who will be affected by the change must be informed and appropriately trained.

Management of Change (MOC) is a set of procedures aimed at preventing unintended risks and complications associated with a change in an organization.

The PSSR is a safety review conducted prior to startup (commissioning) of a new or modified processing/manufacturing plant or facility to ensure that installations meet the original design or operating intent, to catch and re-assess any potential hazard due to changes during the detailed engineering and construction phase of a project.

“Management of Change” refers to the technical side of change. “Change Management” refers to the people side of change.

Management of Change (MOC) is a critical business activity whereby failure to manage change effectively within an organisation can lead to catastrophic consequences. All change no matter how small the change may seem, even if of a temporary nature, can create unforeseen and sometimes unacceptable side effects. All changes, therefore, have to be studied with a holistic systematic approach such that these side effects can be identified, and any resulting risk mitigated appropriately.

The development of an operational safety case involves the effective identification, evaluation and control of potential hazards, as well as a positive argument to justify the various choices that have been made to provide for the facility’s operational safety.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.’

The development of a safety case involves the effective identification, evaluation and control of potential hazards, as well as a positive argument to justify the various choices that have been made to provide for the facility’s safety.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.”

An operational safety case is a written demonstration of evidence and due diligence provided by a corporation to demonstrate that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and can effectively control hazards.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.”

The development of a safety case involves the effective identification, evaluation and control of potential hazards, as well as a positive argument to justify the various choices that have been made to provide for the facility’s safety.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.”

The development of a safety case involves the effective identification, evaluation and control of potential hazards, as well as a positive argument to justify the various choices that have been made to provide for the facility’s safety.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.”

A safety case is a written demonstration of evidence and due diligence provided by a corporation to demonstrate that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and can effectively control hazards.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.’

A safety case is a written demonstration of evidence and due diligence provided by a corporation to demonstrate that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and can effectively control hazards. A safety case engineer is responsible to develop the safety case.

A safety case will help to drive the applicant to meet its public safety objectives and provide for accountability in doing so. All stakeholders (including the regulator) need to have confidence that applicants have carefully thought through and tested how they will keep the public safe. An effective safety case will give confidence to all parties that the applicant is committed to having an operation that carefully considers and manages the risks to public safety, and that they have the capability and capacity to do so.

A safety management system has the following key elements:

– Policy: a safety policy must be stated in line with the organizational goal
– Organization: a safety management organization is to be set
– Planning and implementation: safety planning to be made and implemented
– Performance evaluation: safety performance to be evaluated periodically
– Revision for improvement: safety procedures to be reviewed for improvement in case of a major incident, periodically or due to changes in procedures or technology
– Sustainability: the system must be sustainable to prove its worth

An operational safety case is a written demonstration of evidence and due diligence provided by a corporation to demonstrate that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and can effectively control hazards.

A key consideration of the safety case system is the “ALARP” concept, which requires employers to reduce the risk of hazards to As Low As Reasonably Practicable. “Reasonably practicable” roughly means ‘reasonably possible without undue disproportionate economic cost for the minimal benefit to safety.”

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of equipment, products, work systems, management systems and tasks.

Human Factors Engineering (HFE)

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of equipment, products, work systems, management systems and tasks.

• To reduce risk to health, personal and process safety and the environment;
• To eliminate, reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of human error;
• To improve human efficiency and productivity, thereby enhancing operational performance; and
• To improve user acceptance of new facilities.

• Valve Criticality Analysis (VCA);
• Safety Critical Task Analysis (SCTA);
• Alarm Management;
• Control Room Study; and
• HFE Design Verification.

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of equipment, products, work systems, management systems and tasks.

To validate that flammable and toxic gas dispersion associated with releases from flare sources are within permissible concentrations at identified sensitive locations; and to provide appropriate design modifications, mitigation measures or operational restrictions were necessary to reduce the risk to personnel safety, crane and helicopter operations.

A Flare System is an arrangement of piping and specialised equipment that collects hydrocarbon releases from relief valves, blowdown valves, pressure control valves and manual vents and disposes of them by combustion at a remote and safe location.

Typical components of a Flare System include: Pressure safety valves, blowdown and manual vent valves, pressure control valves, tailpipes, flare knockout drums (KODs) and pumps, emergency gas purge, Flare risers, tips and associated hardware (fuel gas, ignition, steam or air), Associated monitoring and safety systems including infrared monitors.

Typical components of a Flare System include: Pressure safety valves, blowdown and manual vent valves, pressure control valves, tailpipes, flare knockout drums (KODs) and pumps, emergency gas purge, Flare risers, tips and associated hardware (fuel gas, ignition, steam or air), Associated monitoring and safety systems including infrared monitors.

Low pressure (LP) flare is a flaring system for equipment with design pressure of <10 barg

Flare systems provide for the safe disposal of gaseous wastes.

Flaring in oil and gas is commonly done to dispose of natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use.

Flaring in oil and gas is commonly done to dispose of natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use.

A process to safely burn excess hydrocarbon gas that was vented from the industrial operation.

• Noise and radiation for personnel working in close proximity of the flare system
• Release of toxic chemicals (Nox, Sox, heavy metals, aromatic hydrocarbons, soot)
• Release of greenhouse gas (CO2)
• Disruption to the ecosystem

Routine flaring, also known as production flaring, is the combustion of natural gas during the normal oil production operation. This is normally done for natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use.

This is normally done to safely dispose of natural gas (typically methane) that cannot be processed for sale or use. Furthermore, Natural gas is 25 times more potent as a greenhouse gas in comparison to CO2.

Flare gas recovery is a process to recover and repurpose gasses and emissions, such as methane, LPG and Sulphur dioxide.

• Prevent waste gas production
• Recover and reuse waste gas
• Capturing and storing waste gas in oils and reservoirs

From an environmental standpoint, flaring is less detrimental than venting. When combusted, natural gas (typically methane) releases by-products such as CO2 and soot, which are less impactful in terms of global warming contribution.

• Ground flares
• Pit flares
• Elevated flares
• Air-assisted flares
• Steam-assisted flares
• Gas-assisted flares
• Boom flares
• Sonic flares
• High or low-pressure flares
• Low noise flares
• Low radiation flares

Controlled flaring is the controlled burning of natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use because of technical or economic reasons.

A process to safely burn excess hydrocarbon gas that was vented from an industrial operation.

Flaring is the combustion of natural gas at the end of the flare stack. Flame is visible.

An incinerator is the mixing and combusting of gas and air in an enclosed chamber. Flame is not visible if operating properly.

• Ground flares
• Pit flares
• Elevated flares
• Air-assisted flares
• Steam-assisted flares
• Gas-assisted flares
• Boom flares
• Sonic flares
• High or low-pressure flares
• Low noise flares
• Low radiation flares

Waste gas is mixed with steam or air as they are pumped through the header system. The mixed gas will then be ignited by the flare pilot as it travels up the flare stack.

Ignition system to ensure waste gas is immediately ignited during release.

High pressure (HP) flare is a flaring system for equipment with design pressure of >10 barg

• Prevent waste gas production
• Recover and reuse waste gas
• Capturing and storing waste gas in oils and reservoirs

Flaring in oil and gas is commonly done to dispose of natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use.

• Release of toxic chemicals (Nox, Sox, heavy metals, aromatic hydrocarbons, soot)
• Release of greenhouse gas (CO2)
• Disruption to the ecosystem

Flaring can achieve up to 98% carbon efficiency during optimal operation, however, various climate conditions could drop the efficiency to as low as 50%.

Legal requirements associated with flaring is depended on the respective country. Typically legislation requires operators to have consent in place for the flaring and venting of hydrocarbons during production operations. Flaring and venting and associated emissions should be at the lowest possible levels in the circumstances.

Legal requirements associated with flaring is depended on the respective country. Typically legislation requires operators to have consent in place for the flaring and venting of hydrocarbons during production operations. Flaring and venting and associated emissions should be at the lowest possible levels in the circumstances.

Different compositions of gas will change the colour of flares.

A process to safely burn excess hydrocarbon gas that was vented from the industrial operation.

It’s similar to the incinerator, except the combustor is completely enclosed except for the combustion air intake and exhaust discharge.

Liquid injection incinerators are used to dispose of aqueous and nonaqueous wastes that can be atomized through a burner nozzle.

A process to safely burn excess hydrocarbon gas that was vented from the industrial operation.

Steam is used at the flare to aspirate air into the combustion zone, shape the flame of the flare, cool the tip of the flare and reduce noise.

No

Flame Front Generators are a traditional method of lighting flare pilots. It mixes air and fuel gas into an ignition chamber. A spark plug ignites the mixture. The ‘flame front’ travels through a 1′ pipe to the flare pilot.

Waste gas is mixed with steam or air as they are pumped through the header system. The mixed gas will then be ignited by the flare pilot as it travels up the flare stack.

Natural gas is 25 times more potent as a greenhouse gas in comparison to CO2.

Flaring in oil and gas is commonly done to dispose of natural gas that cannot be processed for sale or use.

The purpose of flaring is to convert methane gas to carbon dioxide. Any methane detected from the exhaust is unburnt methane gas.

It is a process to safely burn excess highly reactive hydrocarbon gas that was vented from an industrial operation.

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RAM is an approach for integrating reliability, availability and maintainability, by using methods, tools and engineering techniques (Mean Time to Failure, Equipment down Time and System Availability values) to quantify equipment and system failures that prevent the achievement of the productive objectives in order to identify Production Availability and Production Efficiency. In Oil & Gas Industry risk evaluation model such as RAM is used to improve safety, reliability and availability including the maintenance program of the plants.

RAM is an approach for integrating reliability, availability and maintainability, by using methods, tools and engineering techniques (Mean Time to Failure, Equipment down Time and System Availability values) to quantify equipment and system failures that prevent the achievement of the productive objectives in order to identify Production Availability and Production Efficiency. In Oil & Gas Industry risk evaluation model such as RAM is used to improve safety, reliability and availability including the maintenance program of the plants.

RAM study can be performed at various stages of the life cycle, typically during Pre-FEED, FEED, Detailed engineering and Process Operation stages.

RAM – Reliability, Availability and Maintenance

Maintenance – the ability to be timely and easily maintained (including servicing, inspection and check, repair and/or modification).

RAM study can be conducted with Maros software by DNV GL for reliability modelling to represent real-life scenarios. RAM is conducted to analyse and improve production efficiency.

Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety

A RAM engineer studies the reliability, availability and maintainability of a production system in question, whether it is already operational or still in the design phase. The results from a RAM modelling will identify possible causes of production losses and can examine possible system alternatives, with additional insights for cost-versus-benefits analysis.

Maros and Taro are tools utilized for performing an essential reliability, availability and maintenance analysis.

Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis. The role of FMEA is to identify potential problems that may occur during manufacturing, assembly or design as well as to determine the subsequent effect of failure. Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) build upon the FMEA process by not only identifying potential failure modes but also investigating and isolating any potential failure through a series of actions.

FMECA is a method used to prevent failure and assess the cause of the failure by identifying potential failure modes of a product/process and assessing the risk associated with those failure modes.

FMECA is a method used to prevent failure and assess the cause of the failure by identifying potential failure modes of a product/process and assessing the risk associated with those failure modes.

FMEA – Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FMECA – Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

FMECA is an extension of FMEA. With the criticality component – where ranking/prioritisation of the failure modes/risks is done.
FMEA is a qualitative approach, FMECA contains both qualitative and quantitative information.

1. Perform FMEA
2. Determine Severity Level
3. Assign failure effect probability
4. Assign probability of occurrence
5. calculate & plot criticality
6. Design feedback & risk mitigation
7. perform maintainability analysis

The FMECA is performed prior to any failure actually occurring. FMECA analyzes risk, which is measured by criticality (the combination of severity and probability), to take action and thus provide an opportunity to reduce the possibility of failure.

Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis

Design Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

The current IEC standard is IEC 60812, 3rd Edition, August 2018 – Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA and FMECA)

This document explains how failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), including the failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) variant, is planned, performed, documented and maintained and addresses the following:

-Describes the principles
-Provides the steps in the analysis
-Gives examples of the documentation
-Provides example applications

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

-the normative text is generic and covers all applications;
-examples of applications for safety, automotive, software and (service) processes have been added as informative annexes;
-tailoring the FMEA for different applications is described;
-different reporting formats are described, including a database information system;
-alternative means of calculating risk priority numbers (RPN) have been added;
– a criticality matrix-based method has been added;
-the relationship to other dependability analysis methods has been described.

RAM study can be performed at various stages of the life cycle, typically during Pre-FEED, FEED, Detailed engineering and Process Operation stages.

FMEA is a structured approach to discovering potential failures that may exist within the design of a product or process. Condcuting FMEA allows to identify, prioritize and limit these failure modes.

Failure Mode Effect Criticality Analysis – involves quantitative failure analysis.

The FMECA involves creating a series of linkages between potential failures (Failure Modes), the impact on the mission (Effects) and the causes of the failure (Causes and Mechanisms).

There are Seven Steps to Developing an FMEA:

1. FMEA Pre-Work and Assemble the FMEA Team
2. Path 1 Development (Requirements through Severity Ranking)
3. Path 2 Development (Potential Causes and Prevention Controls through Occurrence Ranking)
4. Path 3 Development (Testing and Detection Controls through Detection Ranking)
5. Action Priority & Assignment
6. Actions Taken / Design Review
7. Re-ranking RPN & Closure

FMECA and FMEA are closely related tools to identify failure modes that may potentially cause product or process failure, thus providing an opportunity to reduce the possibility of failure.

Readiness assessment tool generally involves the use of a customised checklist covering typical areas such as:

• HSE;
• Process Safety;
• Management of Change;
• QA/ QC;
• Maintenance;
• Operating Procedures and Safe Work Practices;
• Training and Competency;
• Emergency Response;
• Electrical & Instrumentation;
• Piping;
• Rotating Equipment;
• Instrumentation and Control;
• SIMOPS; and
• Security

Readiness tests are conducted as part of the readiness assessment to evaluate the preparedness of the facility for live operations. These can comprise safety/emergency drills, pre-startup inspections, equipment test runs, etc.

A readiness report summarises the findings of the readiness assessment as well as any gaps identified.

Customised checklist of questions that need to be answered as part of the Readiness Review process. Typical areas which can be covered in the checklist include:

• HSE;
• Process Safety;
• Management of Change;
• QA/ QC;
• Maintenance;
• Operating Procedures and Safe Work Practices;
• Training and Competency;
• Emergency Response;
• Electrical & Instrumentation;
• Piping;
• Rotating Equipment;
• Instrumentation and Control;
• SIMOPS; and
• Security.

Operational readiness can be assured by systematically following assurance activities to cover necessary project/facility areas.

Energy Institute PSM framework Element 13 provides generic guidance on activity flow. However, organisations should customise and adapt the activities to suit their specific needs and goals.

HSE sees safety management systems (SMS) as crucial mechanisms in the delivery of safety. We apply human and organisational techniques to the elements of the SMS to assess the effectiveness and determine areas for improvement.

Important SMS elements are:

– work control i.e. Permit to work
– supervision
– competence
– effective safety leadership

Company HSE policy

1. Policy
2. Planning and implementing
3. Organising
4. Measuring performance
5. Reviewing performance

Metrics are measures that are used to evaluate and track the performance of a facility’s process safety management program.

Lagging and leading indicators.

unsafe working conditions that can cause injury, illness, and death.

A formal and structured assessment of the safety aspects of projects from the beginning of their life cycle.

Understanding how to conduct a project in a safer manner by considering aspects of safety from engineering design, procurement, construction and commissioning.

SIL refers to the Safety Integrity Level that measures safety system performance, in terms of the probability of failure on demand (PFD).

OSHA recommends that each written plan include the following basic elements:

• Policy or goals statement
• List of responsible persons
• Hazard identification
• Hazard controls and safe practices
• Emergency and accident response
• Employee training and communication
• Recordkeeping

Most businesses set out their policy in three sections:

1. The statement of general policy on health and safety at work sets out your commitment to managing health and safety effectively, and what you want to achieve
2. The responsibility section sets out who is responsible for specific actions
3. The arrangements section contains the detail of what you are going to do in practice to achieve the aims set out in your statement of health and safety policy

OSHA recommends that each written plan include the following basic elements:

1. Policy or goals statement
2. List of responsible persons
3. Hazard identification
4. Hazard controls and safe practices
5. Emergency and accident response
6. Employee training and communication
7. Recordkeeping

SIL 4

You will need to complete a Safety Integrity Level – SIL Analysis (or SIL study) if you have process hazards that need risk reduction using any means of safety instrumented system or safety instrumented function.

To ensure the commitment of the Top Management to eliminate or reduce risks of hazards in the workplace.

A pre-startup safety review (PSSR) is carried out to confirm that all appropriate elements of process safety management have been addressed satisfactorily and that the facility is safe to startup.

PSSR Checklist is a set of discipline-specific questions to be answered by each implementer.

The Pre Start-up Safety Review (PSSR) is a crucial part of any process safety program (PSM), it is the final check to ensure safety and efficacy on a new/modified equipment to confirm all appropriate elements of process safety have been assessed and addressed satisfactorily prior to introducing hazardous chemicals or introducing energy and the facility is safe to operate.

A properly structured PSSR will include a broad cross-functional team, including:

• A knowledgeable and authoritative Chairman/Facilitator
• Design and Construction personnel
• Technical Engineering personnel
• Instrument and Controls personnel
• Maintenance personnel
• Operations personnel
• HSE personnel

PSSR shall be conducted by a team led by PSSR Facilitator and comprising personnel from HSE, Maintenance, Operation and Technical.

A PSSR inspection is carried out to thoroughly review the status of employee training, construction, equipment, and other components involved in a company change.

Pre Start-up Safety Review

A process safety review is a planned and systematic brainstorming meeting for potential hazards identification, risk assessment and reviewing the readiness and effectiveness of risk control measures to ensure safety for personnel and equipment systems in a process plant.

PSSR is the last step in the commissioning process and is managed by the commissioning manager and the owner’s commissioning team jointly.  Vendors and licensors may join PSSR. Completion of PSSR and compliance of all its punch points will validate the facility/system for its readiness and commence safe startup.

PSSR regulations, specifically, are discussed in OSHA 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 1910.119(I):

• The employer shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new facilities and for modified facilities when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information.
• The pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of hazardous chemicals to a process:
• Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications;
• Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate;
• For new facilities, a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup; and modified facilities meet the requirements contained in management of change, paragraph (l).
• Training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

The design of loss prevention systems (such as fire and gas detection systems, firewater systems etc.) is a skill.

Loss Prevention techniques in hydrocarbon facilities are to prevent personal injury or loss of life, to protect the installation from fire, explosion, and operational safety hazards inherent to the facilities and Protection of the environment by early detection of hazardous conditions and the subsequent shutdown, vapour depressurizing, and ventilation of hydrocarbons.

The design of loss prevention systems (such as fire and gas detection systems, firewater systems etc.) is a skill.

The act of reducing severity by identifying the factors that aggravate or increase a loss and taking proactive measures to lessen the effects of those factors.

Loss control (a.k.a. risk reduction) can either be effected through loss prevention, by reducing the probability of risk, or loss reduction, by minimizing the loss.

Loss prevention requires identifying the factors that increase the likelihood of a loss, then either eliminating the factors or minimizing their effect.

In order to eliminate the change of loss, risk control methods (from most effective to least) include:

• Elimination: removing the risk entirely
• Substitution: swapping an item or work process for a safer one (for instance, switching to an industrial cleaner that poses fewer respiratory risks)
• Engineering controls: modifications to the environment or equipment that poses the risk (such as installing mirrors in warehouses or machine guards on circular saws)
• Administrative controls: modifications to the workflow or work process (for example, rotating employees through several different work tasks to prevent repetitive stress injuries)
• Personal protective equipment: safety gear worn by the workers, such as hard hats, safety glasses, and chemical-resistant gloves

You have loss prevention in your business if you have any actions taken to reduce the number of hazards and mitigate risk in your organisation.

Some risks can be eliminated but not all risks can be avoided.

Common strategies for risk responses are avoided, transfer, mitigate, and accept.

Risk control begins with a risk assessment to identify the presence and severity of workplace hazards. Employers must then implement the most effective controls available.

In order of effectiveness (from most effective to least), risk control methods include:

• Elimination: removing the risk entirely
• Substitution: swapping an item or work process for a safer one (for instance, switching to an industrial cleaner that poses fewer respiratory risks)
• Engineering controls: modifications to the environment or equipment that poses the risk (such as installing mirrors in warehouses or machine guards on circular saws)
• Administrative controls: modifications to the workflow or work process (for example, rotating employees through several different work tasks to prevent repetitive stress injuries)
• Personal protective equipment: safety gear worn by the workers, such as hard hats, safety glasses, and chemical-resistant gloves

Not all risks can be avoided. Notable in this category is the risk of death. But even where it can be avoided, it is often not desirable. By avoiding risk, you may be avoiding many pleasures of life or the potential profits that result from taking risks. A business cannot operate without taking some risks. Virtually any activity involves some risk. Generally, risk should be avoided when losses are large and gains are small. Where avoidance is not possible or desirable, loss control is the next best thing.

Three simple steps for successful Risk Management include Risk Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Planning.

Loss prevention in the oil & gas, energy, chemical and petrochemical industries concerns the identification and assessment of possible plant accidents and losses, including process safety issues, with the aim to ensure the required engineering and operational measures to prevent or mitigate loss.

Accidents can be prevented by these tips but are not limited to:

• Having competency people and a training framework in place
• Preventative and Corrective maintenance programs in place
• Adhere to internationally process safety guidelines (eg. OSHA)
• Encourage Safety communication

Improved safety studies and training programs; implementing new, less hazardous processes; programs/projects to reduce injuries and property loss; and/ or general safety enhancements.

The act of reducing severity by identifying the factors that aggravate or increase a loss and taking proactive measures to lessen the effects of those factors.

An engineer who involves in all activities intended to help organizations in any industry to prevent the loss, whether it be through injury, fire, explosion, toxic release, natural disaster, terrorism or other security threats.

Any hazards that can lead to fires, explosions and toxic releases resulting in fatalities/ injuries, major asset loss and impact to the environment.

A loss control activity focuses on reducing the severity of losses. Examples include building firewalls to reduce the spread of fire and installing automatic fire sprinklers.

Zone 2: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.

Class I—Locations in which flammable gases or vapors may or may not be insufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Group D—Atmospheres containing a flammable gas, flammable liquid-produced vapour, or combustible liquid-produced vapour whose MESG is greater than 0.75 mm or MIC ration is greater than 0.80. Typical gases include acetone, ammonia, benzene, butane, ethanol, gasoline, methane, natural gas, naphtha, and propane.

Class II—Locations in which combustible dust (either in suspension, intermittently, or periodically) may or may not be insufficient
quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Class III—Locations in which ignitable fibres may or may not be insufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Zone 1—Ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapours which are likely to occur under normal operating conditions.

Zone 2: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.

By looking at the HAC drawing where the area classification records can comprise detailed drawings with notes and/or can be in the form of tabulations. The area classification drawings should indicate sufficient scale to show all the main items of equipment and all the buildings in both plan and elevation.

The electrical disciplines engineer

The Group defines the type of hazardous material in the surrounding atmosphere. Groups A, B, C, and D are for gases (Class I only) while groups E, F, and G are for dust and flyings (Class II or III).

Zone 1 is an area in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation, and Zone 2 is an area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.

Area in which combustible dust is likely to occur in normal operation.

Zone 21 is an area in which combustible dust is likely to occur in normal operation, and Zone 22 is an area in which combustible dust is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.

Class 1 is more hazardous than Class 2, so Class 2 could be considered a “safer” or better area compared to Class 1.

Liquids that have flash points from 21oC up to & including 55oC are handled at or above the flashpoint.

No, it’s only for General Purpose Weather Proof.

Zone 0, 1, and 2 for Gas, and 20, 21, and 22 for Dust.

Group D

The Group defines the type of hazardous material in the surrounding atmosphere. Groups A, B, C, and D are for gases (Class I only).

Locations in which flammable gases or vapours may or may not be in sufficient quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

A type of protection in which an enclosure can withstand the pressure developed during an internal explosion of an explosive mixture and that prevents the transmission of the explosion to the explosive atmosphere surrounding the enclosure and that operates at such an external temperature that a surrounding explosive gas or vapour will not be ignited there. This type of protection is referred to as “Ex D”.

Sprinkler demand, expressed in gpm, is the amount of water per unit time that is required for adequate sprinkler protection. Theoretically, sprinkler demand is equal to density (gpm/ft^2) multiplied by the demand area (ft^2).

Q = 29.84(cd)(d^2)*(sqrt(p))
29.84 is a constant derived from physical laws relating to water velocity, pressure, and conversion factors. In short, this number keeps the answer in GPM.
cd = the coefficient of discharge, which represents friction loss.
d = the actual inside diameter of the hydrant orifice in inches.
p = the pressure in PSI read at the orifice by the pitot gauge. Because this formula takes the square root of p—rather than p itself—large increases in PSI will have a fairly small impact on the final GPM.
Q = a number used to represent the result or discharge in GPM

Average Daily Demand (ADD) is the total volume of water delivered to the system over a year divided by 365 days.

The firewater Ringmain is a header network of pipes that transfers the water from the pumps to the fire.

NFPA 291 provides guidance on fire flow tests and marking of hydrants in order to determine and indicate the relatively available fire service water supply from hydrants and to identify possible deficiencies which could be corrected to ensure adequate fire flows as needed.

The formula to find GPM is 60 divided by the seconds it takes to fill a one-gallon container (GPM = 60 / seconds)

A Wet riser is used to supply water within multiple levels or compartments of a building for fire fighting purposes.

A Class C fire requires an agent that can break apart the elements that feed a fire: oxygen, heat, and fuel. Class C fire extinguisher which contains mono ammonium phosphate, potassium bicarbonate, or potassium chloride, all of which are suitable for putting out Class C fires.

A fire pump provides high-pressure water accessibility to the fire sprinkler system, increasing the flow rate of the water. They are used to increase the pressure of the water source when that source is not adequate for the system it’s supplying.

The fire brigade uses fire fighting pipe, which is a type of normal carbon steel pipe used to convey fire suppression agents such as water or gas.

A deluge valve is a type of system actuation valve that is opened by a detection system and they are used in conditions that require large volumes of water in a relatively short period of time.

NFPA 24 helps ensure water supplies are available in a fire emergency, with detailed requirements for the installation of private fire service mains and their appurtenances supplying private hydrants and water-based fire protection systems.

Fire prevention involves reducing fuel for a fire, reducing or controlling ignition sources and keeping fuel and ignition sources apart.

Management of the fire triangle or combustion triangle i.e. oxygen, heat, fuel and chemical reaction.

Class A: burning flammable solids
Class B: burning flammable liquids.
Class C: Electrical equipment
Class D: burning flammable metals
Class K: burning cooking oils or fat.

Most fire extinguishers work by eliminating one or more combustion elements e.g. separating the fuel from the oxygen.

Carbon dioxide is normally used to suppress fire by depriving it of fuel, oxygen, or heat.

CO2 is a relatively clean gas that doesn’t react with burning materials, so it doesn’t create any toxic or other by-products when used to suppress a fire.

Dry chemical foam or powder fire extinguisher can effectively handle gas fire.

The main principles of heat transfer are:

• Direct contact
• Conduction
• Radiation
• Convection
• Flashover
• Backdraught

Fire prevention involves reducing fuel for a fire, reducing or controlling ignition sources and keeping fuel and ignition sources apart.

Burn pattern is the visible or measurable physical changes or identifiable shapes formed by a fire effect or group of fire effects.

Incipient, growth, fully developed, and decay.

Fire safety is the set of practices intended to reduce the destruction caused by fire. Fire safety measures include those that are intended to prevent the ignition of an uncontrolled fire and those that are used to limit the development and effects of a fire after it starts.

Horizontal exit means an arrangement which allows alternative egress from a floor area to another floor at or near the same level in an adjoining building or an adjoining part of the same building with adequate separation.

Fire escape routes should be routinely inspected as practicable.

29 CFR 1910.157

• Valve Criticality Analysis (VCA);
• Safety Critical Task Analysis (SCTA);
• Alarm Management;
• Control Room Study; and
• HFE Design Verification.

By understanding the working environment, user task demands as well as work constraints, work systems can be designed and/or improved in such a way to optimise human contribution to production and minimises the potential for design-induced risks to health, personal, process safety or environmental performance.

5 core human factors elements are work, organisation, equipment, environment and people.

Human Factors Engineers work in an industry/ office where human factors elements are required.

By understanding the working environment, user task demands as well as work constraints, work systems can be designed and/or improved in such a way to optimise human contribution to production and minimises the potential for design-induced risks to health, personal, process safety or environmental performance.

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of equipment, products, work systems, management systems and tasks.

Human factors studies factors that shape performance, such as performance shaping factors/performance influencing factors;
error producing conditions, and violation producing conditions in which humans work to make human failures less likely

Human failures are not random events but are shaped by factors, either more immediate factors (such as working conditions – high workload, in a stressful or emergency situation) or more latent factors (such as managerial behaviour, company culture, etc.). We cannot change the human condition, we can only change the conditions (the factors that shape performance) in which humans work to make human failures less likely.

Human factor management aims to ensure that the work procedures and policies of the organisation are compatible with human capabilities, that training is sufficient, that the workforce is competent, and there is enough spare capacity to deal with emergency situations.

The Fire & Gas Detection Layout is a plant layout with the number and position of fire and/or gas detectors available on site.

The objective of the study is to assess the adequacy of the fire and gas detection system based on international codes and standards. The assessment considers the material properties, redundancy provided by the F&G detectors as well as blocking of the line of sight. Where deemed necessary, suitable practicable recommendations will be made to improve the fire and gas detection system performance.

Gas detectors are required where there is potential for flammable or toxic gas releases to occur.

Gas mapping is the study and optimisation of toxic/flammable gas detectors to meet set coverage targets.

The following standard can be referred to for designing gas detection systems:

• IEC 60079 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres
• EEMUA 191 Alarm Systems – A Guide to Design, Management and Procurement
• EN 50054/56/57/58 Electrical Apparatus for the Detection and Measurement of Combustible Gases
• ISA RP 12.13.03 Recommended Practice for the Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Combustible Gas Detection Instrument

Gas detectors can be used to detect combustible, flammable and toxic gases and oxygen depletion. Most devices can measure and detect ammonia, carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, bromine, arsine, ozone, and other gases.

A fire alarm system warns people when smoke, fire, carbon monoxide or other fire-related emergencies are detected. These alarms may be activated automatically from smoke detectors, and heat detectors or may also be activated via manual fire alarm activation devices.

An automatic fire alarm system detects a fire in its early stages (activated by occupants of the building or by the transmission of fire alarm signals to an alarm-receiving centre), notifies the building occupants that there is a fire emergency and reports the emergency to the first responders.

A fire and gas detection system warn people when smoke, fire, carbon monoxide, and other flammable and toxic gases are detected.

Gas detectors are categorized by the type of gas they detect: combustible or toxic. They are then further defined by the technology they use: catalytic and infrared sensors detect combustible gases and electrochemical and metal oxide semiconductor technologies generally detect toxic gases.

It is important to mount the gas detection heads in areas that are most likely to first be exposed to a gas leak, or that are most representative of the gas levels in the area being monitored.

There are four main types of gas detectors, namely electrochemical sensors, catalytic sensors, infrared sensors and photoionization sensors.

The four main types of gas detectors are electrochemical sensors, catalytic sensors, infrared sensors and photoionization sensors.

Yes, there is a detector for methane gas. Infrared or catalytic gas detectors can be used to detect methane gas.

A 5-gas meter gives you the flexibility of one additional sensor or possible a PID (Photo Ionizing Detector) in addition to monitoring oxygen levels, flammability of the atmosphere and common toxic substances, such as Carbon Monoxide or Hydrogen Sulfide.

Infrared CO2 detectors can be used to detect carbon dioxide and a range of other combustible gases.

An electrochemical or EC sensor measures the concentration of gas by oxidizing or reducing the gas and the electrode is used to measure the resulting electrical current output. These types of sensors are used for detecting oxygen and toxic gases.

A catalytic, Cat EX or combustible sensor oxidizes a combustible gas and converts the temperatures change into an electrical signal. These types of sensors are used for detecting combustible gases, such as methane, propane and hydrogen.

An infrared or IR sensor measures trace gases by determining the absorption of an emitted infrared light source through an air sample. These types of sensors are used for detecting carbon dioxide and a wide range of combustible gases.

A photo-ionization detector or PID breaks molecules into positive and negative charged ions and measures the electrical charge of these ions using a detector to display the amount of gas or vapour that is present. These types of sensors are used for detecting volatile organic vapors (VOCs) and toxic gases.

Smoke and gas sensors will detect the gas particles produced during a fire and turns the electricity supply on to trigger fire alarm sounds.

Greenhouse gas is any gas that can absorb infrared radiation (net heat energy) emitted from Earth’s surface and reradiate it back to Earth’s surface, thus contributing to the greenhouse effect.

Crude oil is a mixture of hydrocarbons that formed from the remains of animals and plants (diatoms) that lived millions of years ago in a marine environment.

Natural gas is lighter than air and therefore will rise.

Natural gas is flammable, however, it is not easy to ignite. Natural gas has a flammability range of approximately 5 to 15 % which means that any mixture containing less than 5 per cent or greater than 15% natural gas to air would not combust.

Flammable gas is a gas that burns in the presence of an oxidant when provided with a source of ignition.

Inert gases are non-combustible, non-flammable, and non-reactive to many materials. Examples include argon, helium, nitrogen, and neon.

Potential fuel is material which will burn and is in enough quantity for a fire. This includes contents, fixtures, fittings, structure, wall and ceiling linings and surfaces.

Fire hazards come in three categories: ignition, fuel and oxygen.

Fire hazards are hazards that either involve the presence of a flame, increase the probability that an uncontrolled fire will occur, or increase the severity of a fire.

Common fire risks found in factories include heavy machinery malfunctions, flammable stock accumulation, and combustible dust.

The top 5 common causes of commercial fire are cooking equipment, heating equipment, electrical & lighting equipment, smoking materials and intentional.

Common fire prevention and control include installing smoke and fire detectors, water sprinklers, clear emergency exit pathways, provision of flame retardants, and conducting regular fire drills.

1. Check that all smoke and fire alarms are functioning properly
Test your fire alarms once a month and replace batteries twice a year.

2. Have an actionable fire plan
Knowing what you actually need to do and where to go are hallmarks of any good fire safety plan. This includes grabbing important documents and making sure everyone is present and accounted for.

3. Never leave a room with an open flame
Reduce your risks by never leaving an open flame (no matter how small) unattended.

4. Have at least one fire extinguisher
Remember “PASS” – Pull the pin, Aim the nozzle at the base of the fire, Squeeze the handle, and Sweep back and forth to put out the fire.

5. Stop, Drop, and Roll
In the unfortunate event of you or your clothing catching fire, make sure that you have this very basic but very essential movement down. It could save your life.

Management of the fire triangle or combustion triangle i.e. oxygen, heat, fuel and chemical reaction.

Fire-protection and life safety systems include building exit systems, fire-alarm systems, and fire-suppression systems to minimize the impact of fire on people and property.

Fire protection relies on system components to detect and prevent fires and mitigate their consequences whereas fire prevention requires inspection, testing, and maintenance of systems to ensure they are operating properly and they are effective during a fire.